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YET ANOTHER BOUGH ON THE "JUDICIAL
OAK"': THE SECOND CIRCUIT CLARIFIES
INQUIRY NOTICE AND ITS LOSS
CAUSATION REQUIREMENT UNDER THE
PSLRA IN LENTELL V. MERRILL LYNCH &
Co.
DEVIN F. RYAN
"October. This is one of the peculiarly dangerous months to
speculate in stocks in. The others are July, January, September,
April, November, May, March, June, December, August, and
February. "2
INTRODUCTION
Mark Twain's timeless quip, coined over a century ago by the
sage-like curmudgeon, serves as a fitting prologue to this
Comment. Even when viewed through the rose-tinted lenses of
hindsight bias3 and with an appreciation of the efficient capital
markets hypothesis,4 Wall Street arguably remains the same
The Supreme Court signaled its acceptance of a private right of action under
section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and
Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, with then Justice Rehnquist's legendary
phrase: "When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a
judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn. Such growth
may be quite consistent with the congressional enactment and with the role of the
federal judiciary in interpreting it .. " Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
This Comment's title alludes to Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.'s, 396 F.3d 161 (2d
Cir. 2005), place among those watershed decisions construing and applying the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
J.D. Candidate, June 2005, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., 1997,
United States Merchant Marine Academy.
2 MARK TWAIN, THE TRAGEDY OF PUDD'NHEAD WILSON 166 (Am. Publ'g Co.
1900) (1894).
3 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 571-73 (1998) (discussing retrospective legal
assessments and the "prejudicial aspects of judging in hindsight" especially in the
realm of securities fraud).
4 Credit for the study of the economic implications of the efficient capital
markets hypothesis belongs to University of Chicago Economics Professor Eugene F.
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fickle yet alluring mistress it was when Twain put pen to paper.
From time in memorial, echoes of a mantra could be heard from
the Street: one person's loss is another's gain.' The past
decade-awash with waves of frenzied, high-risk speculation-
was aptly epitomized the era of "irrational exuberance. 6 At the
risk of sounding profound, the. resulting deluge of securities
litigation was inevitable, particularly in the area of analyst
conflicts of interest. Disappointed investors invoked the
securities laws in hope of recouping their losses.
The federal courts have construed section 10(b)7 of the
Exchange Act and its regulatory counterpart, Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5,' as collectively establishing a
private right of action for fraud and misrepresentation under the
federal securities laws.9 Litigants alleging a violation of these
Fama and his seminal article, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FINANCE 383 (1970). See also Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient
Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 907, 910-11 (1989) ('The efficient capital markets hypothesis posits that stock
prices quickly reflect information without bias.... The empirical evidence to date
(with some exceptions) appears to establish the validity of the weak and semi-strong
versions but not the strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis.");
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 549-50 (1984) (addressing how the theory has influenced a
reassessment of the modern securities law, judicial decisions, and the practice of
law); Marvin G. Pickholz & Edward B. Horahan III, The SEC's Version of the
Efficient Market Theory and Its Impact on Securities Law Liabilities, 39 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 943, 943 (1982) ('The efficient market theory... affects both the
methods and responsibilities of disclosure as mandated by the securities laws.").
5 At least two scholars posit that P.T. Barnum's adage, "[There's a sucker born
every minute," was apropos to the present state of affairs on Wall Street. See
Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Economic Suicide: The Collision of Ethics and Risk in
Securities Law, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 483, 486 (2003) (noting that "the inexperience
and naivet6 of... investors may be yet another occasion for P.T. Barnum cynicism").
6 It was Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan who coined the idiom
"irrational exuberance," connoting a decade of high-risk trading by investors with
little or no knowledge of the market forces at play. See ROBERT J. SHILLER,
IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 3 (2000).
' 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000) ("It shall be unlawful for any person... (b) To use or
employ ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe ... ").
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004) ("It shall be unlawful for any person... (b) To
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading .... ).
9 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. The federal courts first recognized a
private cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in the case of Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946), and the Supreme
Court affirmed this judge-made private right of action in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
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general antifraud provisions confront a Homeric dilemma as they
attempt, often unsuccessfully,' ° to navigate the waters between
the statutory Scylla and Charybdis embodied in the loss
causation requirement forged under section 21D(b)(4)" of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the "PSLRA")12
and the inquiry notice trigger that commences the running of the
antifraud provisions' statute of limitations.
1 3
Recently, in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 4 Judge Dennis
Jacobs, writing for a unanimous panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, clarified two frequently
litigated aspects of the PSLRA."5 In affirming, though reversing
in part, the district court's dismissal of two consolidated
securities fraud class actions, 16 the Second Circuit: (1) clarified
that only detailed information relating directly to the alleged
misrepresentations and omissions of the defendant will trigger
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375, 380 n.10 (1983).
'0 In complex litigation such as securities class actions, to sue is human, to
settle divine. Not surprisingly, one commentator notes that she was "unaware of any
case awarding damages to an investor who brought a claim for securities fraud
under the [Exchange Act] against an analyst or other industry participant lacking a
fiduciary duty to the investor for recommending a security in a research report
without disclosing conflicts of interest." Jill I. Gross, Securities Analysts' Undisclosed
Conflicts of Interest: Unfair Dealing or Securities Fraud?, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
631, 661 (2002).
11 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000) ("In any private action arising under this
chapter, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the
defendant alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks
to recover damages.") (emphasis added).
12 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
"3 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (2000) ("No action shall be maintained to enforce any
liability created under this section, unless brought within one year after the
discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such
violation.") (emphasis added). Unlike the situation in Lentell, for claims brought
after the August, 29, 2002 effective date of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1658), the statute of limitations
was increased to two years after discovery and to five years after the violation. See §
804, 116 Stat. at 801.
14 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005).
'5 The circuit held that the actions were timely filed. Id. at 164. It affirmed the
underlying dismissal, however, "on the ground that the complaints fail to plead that
the alleged misrepresentations and omissions caused the claimed losses." Id.
16 Lentell was the product of two putative class action complaints, 24/7 Real
Media, Inc., No. 02-CV-3210 (MP), and Interliant, Inc., No. 02-CV-3321 (MP),
consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation into one docket, No.
02-MDL-1484 (MP), for ease of administration. See id. at 165; In re Merrill Lynch &
Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 357, 359 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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the inquiry notice provision applicable to the statute of
limitations 7 and, more notably, (2) elucidated prior circuit
opinions dealing with the elusive and ever fluid concept of loss
causation, providing hornbook-like guidance on the Second
Circuit's stringent standard for pleading loss causation,
especially in suits premised on analysts' conflicts of interest.
8
Lentell was immediately touted as 'a very significant decision for
the securities litigation bar."" 9  This Comment critically
examines the decision, focusing on the circuit's meticulous
analysis of both inquiry notice and the loss causation
requirement.
It is submitted that the Second Circuit's decision in Lentell
bolsters the already Sisyphean task of pleading securities fraud
under the PSLRA, especially for claims based solely on analysts'
conflicts of interest. In doing so, the Second Circuit advanced
Congress's statutory intentions in drafting the PSLRA a decade
ago-curbing abusive private securities litigation2°-rather than
17 See infra Part II.A.
i" See infra Part II.B.
'9 Mark Hamblett, Investors' Failure to Link Merrill's Reports to Losses Is Fatal
to Suits, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 21, 2005, at 1 (quoting counsel for Merrill Lynch, Jay B.
Kasner of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom). With front-page, color-coverage
the day after the circuit announced it decision, the New York Law Journal reported
that the decision "raises the bar high for suits based on analyst recommendations
and jeopardizes dozens of such actions against Merrill Lynch." Id.; see also Phyllis
Diamond, 2d Cir. Sees No Loss Causation in Fraud Claims Based on Analyst
Reports, 37 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 173 (2005) (reporting that Marc B. Dorfman
of Foley & Lardner in Washington D.C. commented that Lentell is
"significant ... because it clarifies the Second Circuit's standard for pleading loss
causation"); Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Loss Causation in the Research
Analyst Cases (and Beyond), N.Y. L.J., Jan. 26, 2005, at 3 ("Much of the confusion
that has long been associated with loss causation was stripped away by the court's
forceful and unvarnished opinion in Lentell.").
20 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 171 ("[T]he congressional intent of the PSLRA [was]
'to deter strike suits wherein opportunistic private plaintiffs file securities fraud
claims of dubious merit in order to exact large settlement recoveries."' (quoting
Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2000))); see also James Bohn & Stephen
Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class
Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 907-08 (1996) (arguing that based on empirical
evidence most of the securities fraud class actions filed are strike suits, whereby the
putative plaintiff classes are seeking a profitable settlement rather than trial).
For a comprehensive overview and critique of the legislative history behind the
PSLRA, see John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding
Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335
(1996); David S. Escoffery, Note, A Winning Approach to Loss Causation Under Rule
1OB-5 in Light of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1781, 1809-15 (2000).
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averting the clear congressional mandate as other circuits had
done.2" This Comment argues that Lentell's precedential value
lies in its clarification of the murky waters surrounding the
circuit's narrow reading of the loss causation standard that were
muddied, in part, by other Second Circuit decisions. The circuit
reconfirmed that a fact-specific inquiry into the causal link
between the fraud and the drop in price is still an indispensable
touchstone of pleading securities fraud. As a result of the Lentell
court's analysis, the circuit reset the benchmark of its loss
causation pleading standards to the heightened level originally
intended by Congress under the PSLRA. Additionally, although
of somewhat lesser jurisprudential import than the circuit's
tutorial on loss causation, Lentell reemphasized that generalized
"storm warnings" of market-wide research analysts' conflicts do
not trigger the statute of limitations' inquiry notice provision.
Lentell will unquestionably increase the mortality rate for
securities fraud cases 22 still lingering on the federal docket,
23
21 Historically, there was a circuit split, a full discussion of which is well beyond
the scope of this Comment, regarding the proper loss causation standard under the
PSLRA. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits took a more lenient artificial price inflation
approach, while the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits require a
more stringent showing of a foreseeable and direct causal connection between the
alleged fraud and the stock's drop in price.
This circuit split led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in a Ninth Circuit
case, Broudo v. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 124 S. Ct. 2904 (2004). See, e.g., Gregory A. Markel et al., Pleading Loss
Causation in Securities Litigation, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 18, 2004, at S6. On review, the
Supreme Court, with Justice Breyer delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court,
firmly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's artificial price inflation theory and
affirmed the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit's requirement for a
causal link between the fraud and the drop in price. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v.
Broudo, No. 03-932, 2005 WL 885109 (U.S. April 19, 2005), at *1, 125 S. Ct. 1627
(2005).
22 See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor
Grundfest's "Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Commission's Authority," 108 HARv. L. REV. 438, 446 (1994)
(extrapolating data showing that "a substantial percentage of all federal securities
class actions filed were dismissed on motions before trial").
23 See Flumenbaum & Karp, supra note 19; see also, e.g., In re Initial Public
Offering Secs. Litig., No. MDL 1554(SAS), 2005 WL 743550, at *1, *5 nn.63-64, *7
n.82, *12 n.119 (S.D.N.Y. April 1, 2005) (citing various aspects of Lentell as
authority for granting defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice); Hampshire
Equity Partners II, L.P. v. Teradyne, Inc., 04 Civ. 3318(LAP), 2005 WL 736217, at
*1, -4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2005) (same); In re Salomon Analyst, 02 Civ. 6801(GEL),
2005 WL 550847, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2005) (staying all proceedings, such as
discovery, during the pendency of defendant's motion to dismiss, which was filed as
a result of the Lentell decision); Clark v. Nevis Capital Mgmt., LLC, 04 Civ.
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especially those premised on analysts' conflicts. Moreover,
Lentell arguably "paved the way for the Supreme Court's opinion
in Dura Pharmaceuticals,24 where the circuit split over the
proper loss causation requirement was recently laid to rest.25
Part I of this Comment begins with an overview of the
underlying claims at issue in Lentell and the district court's
rationale for dismissing those claims on the pleadings.26 Part II
provides a synopsis of the concerns surrounding securities
analysts' conflicts of interest as a backdrop for the legal analysis
employed by the circuit.27 Part III focuses on the two issues that
Lentell illuminated: the inquiry notice provision applicable to the
statute of limitations2 and the loss causation requirement under
the PSLRA. E° Ultimately, the Comment concludes with the
author's forecast of Lentell's weight and moment on pending, and
yet to be filed, securities fraud litigation.
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs in Lentell were a putative class of jaded, non-
client purchasers ° who bought shares in certain Internet-related
companies during the waning portion of the technology stock
boom.3 The defendants were Wall Street titans, Merrill Lynch &
Company and Henry M. Blodget, Merrill Lynch's infamous
research analyst, 2  who published research reports
2702(RWS), 2005 WL 488641, at *1, *7, *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2005) (citing Lentell as
authority for granting, in part, defendant's motion to dismiss yet allowing plaintiffs
leave to replead); ATSI Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 357 F. Supp. 2d.
712, 717 & n.36 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Lentell as authority for granting defendant's
motion to dismiss with prejudice); In re Recoton Corp. Sec. Litig., 358 F. Supp. 2d.
1130, 1138 & n.4 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (citing Lentell as authority for granting
defendant's motion to dismiss, without prejudice, and allowing plaintiffs leave to
replead).
24 Flumenbaum & Karp, supra note 19.
25 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 30-60 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 61-82 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 93-122 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 123-75 and accompanying text.
30 These investors had no contractual or fiduciary relationship with the
investment firm, Merrill Lynch. See In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec.
Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("No customer relationship with
defendants is claimed by the plaintiffs; no fiduciary or contractual relations
existed....").
"1 The plaintiffs purchased shares in 24/7 Real Media, Inc. and Interliant, Inc.
between the period of May 12, 1999 and February 20, 2001. See id. at 360.
32 The defendants from Merrill Lynch were Merrill Lynch & Co., its wholly-
[Vol. 79:485
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recommending the purchase of shares in certain Internet
companies.33  The reports purported to reflect the analysts'
opinions on the competitive position of these investments,
evaluations of past performance, and projections of estimated
future performance.34 Moreover, the reports contained a rating
system encompassing both the investment risk and the
appreciation potential of the companies in question.35  Of
particular analytical significance in the Lentell opinion was the
fact that Merrill Lynch's reports indicated the highly volatile
level of investment risk for these stocks36 but, nonetheless,
forecasted substantial appreciation potential.37 The plaintiffs
claimed, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of securities analysts'
conflicts of interest led Merrill Lynch to issue "false and
misleading reports recommending that investors purchase
shares" in these Internet ventures. 8 The plaintiffs' calculus,
however, erroneously equated the non-disclosure of these
conflicts of interest to a violation of federal securities laws'
antifraud provisions. 9
Presiding over the underlying class actions was the recently
deceased Senior Judge for the Southern District of New York,
Milton Pollack,4 ° who was no stranger to this genre of complex
owned subsidiary Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., and individual
defendant, Henry Blodget, the former first vice president of Merrill Lynch's internet
sector. See id. at 355. On appeal, however, only Merrill Lynch & Co. and Mr. Blodget
were named as defendants-appellees. See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d
161, 164 (2d Cir. 2005).
33 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 165-67; Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 359-60.
34 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 165-67; Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 361.
31 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 166 & n.1; Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 361.
36 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 166, 176 & nn.6-7, 177; Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp.
2d at 361 (discussing Merrill Lynch's "Investment Risk Rating," which, incidentally,
was denoted in all of the Merrill Lynch reports under fire in these cases and ranged
from "A," the lowest risk rating, to "D," the highest level).
37 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 166 & n.1; Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 361
(illustrating that Merrill Lynch's "Appreciation Potential" for the stocks in these
cases were "estimated to appreciate by 20% or more within the immediately
following 12 months and 10-20% for the 12 months following" the report's issuance).
38 Lentell, 396 F.3d at 164.
39 See id. at 164, 177; Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 358 ("The facts and
circumstances ... show beyond doubt that plaintiffs brought their own losses upon
themselves when they knowingly spun an extremely high-risk, high-stakes wheel of
fortune.").
40 See Damien Cave, Milton Pollack, Noted Federal District Judge, Dies at 97,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2004, at B7. Graduating from Columbia Law School in 1929,
Judge Pollack was appointed to the federal bench in 1967 by President Lyndon B.
Johnson and was a judge in the Southern District of New York for over thirty-six
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securities litigation.4 1  With his legendary wit,42 Judge Pollack
granted the defendants' pre-answer motion to dismiss 43 the "two
prolix ' " complaints pursuant to section 21D of the PSLRA45 and
Rules 12(b)(6) 46 and 9(b)47 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
while threatening, but not employing, the use of sanctions. 8 In a
years. See id.; see also Mark Hamblett, Judge Pollack Feted on His 96th Birthday,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 30, 2002, at 1.
A Wall Street Journal article relates a comical and somewhat infamous story
told by Chief Judge Michael Mukasey of the Southern District of New York about
Pollack's early years as a plaintiffs' lawyer. While taking a deposition from Spyros
Skouras, the head of 20th Century Fox at the time, Pollack, without asking, selected
and lit a cigar from Mr. Skouras's humidor. Chief Judge Mukasey explains, "Visibly
reddening, Mr. Skouras said: 'Mr. Pollack, I don't remember offering you a cigar.'
Mr. Pollack replied, 'Those aren't your cigars, those are the stockholders' cigars."'
Ann Davis & Randall Smith, Judge Pollack's Investor Lectures, WALL ST. J., July 3,
2003, at C1.
41 In 2001, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1) and Rule 8(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Pollack dismissed yet another group of consolidated
cases, which alleged violations of Rule 10(b)(5) based on false or misleading analyst
reports and buy recommendations and named Morgan Stanley Dean Witter and its
lead analyst Mary Meeker as defendants. See, e.g., Williams v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter & Co., No. 01 CIV. 7500(MP), 2001 WL 964010 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2001).
42 Furthering Mark Twain's cynical view of the market, Judge Pollack curtly
admonished the plaintiff class with the following colorful quip:
Seeking to lay the blame for the enormous Internet Bubble solely at the
feet of a single actor, Merrill Lynch, plaintiffs would have this Court
conclude that the federal securities laws were meant to underwrite,
subsidize, and encourage their rash speculation in joining a freewheeling
casino that lured thousands obsessed with the fantasy of Olympian riches,
but which delivered such riches to only a scant handful of lucky
winners.... [P]laintiffs brought their own losses upon themselves when
they knowingly spun an extremely high-risk, high-stakes wheel of fortune.
Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 358.
41 See id. at 355; see also Michael Carroll, Justice for Wall Street, WALL ST. J.,
July 22, 2003, at B2 ("There are glimmers of hope for Wall Street these
days.... [Judge Pollack's] decision may suggest a pendulum swing away from the
banker bashing that has been so popular of late.... [and] could change the world of
securities class actions as we know it.").
4 Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 369 ("It has not been an easy task to comb
through the two prolix and unnecessarily repetitive complaints-each of which is 68
pages in length....").
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) to (b)(2), (b)(4) (2000).
46 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ("[The following defenses may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion: ... (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.") (emphasis added).
47 FED. R. CiV. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.") (emphasis added).
48 In alluding to the imposition of sanctions, Judge Pollack warned that the
"[d]efendants have moved to strike [the complaint], and not without reasonable
basis," yet "mindful of its obligation to construe pleadings so as to do substantial
justice, the Court instead decided to shoulder, itself, the burden of threshing all of
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thorough, forty-three page opinion, the district court dismissed
the pleadings mainly for failing to adequately plead loss
causation,4" failing to plead fraud with the requisite level of
particularity, ° and failing to commence the action in a timely
manner.
51
On appeal, the circuit held that the actions were timely
filed;52 however, it affirmed the underlying dismissal "on the
ground that the complaints fail[ed] to plead that the alleged
misrepresentations and omissions caused the claimed losses. 53
Paying considerable attention to the "systematic and consistent
risk indicator[s]" contained in these research reports,54 Lentell
culminates in a succinct tutorial on the Second Circuit's loss
causation standard in analyst conflict cases.5  The court's
tutorial reaffirms and clarifies a line of recent circuit
decisions 56-Emergent Capital Investment Management, LLC v.
the chaff in search of any kernels that might emerge from the complaints." Merrill
Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 369-70 (citations omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)
("A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief.., shall contain ... (2) a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.")
(emphasis added). Rule 8 goes on to provide that "[a]ll statements shall be made
subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2).
49 See Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 362-68.
50 See id. at 368-75.
"' See id. at 382-90.
52 See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 167-72 (2d Cir. 2005). 'The
articles cited by the district court describe the conflicted situation of Wall Street's
research analysts; but evidence of the outright falsity of Merrill Lynch's investment
recommendations is stray and indiscriminate at best, and is insufficient to put
plaintiffs on inquiry notice of the specific frauds alleged." Id. at 171.
" Id. at 164.
5 Id. at 176 ("In addition to this systematic and consistent risk indicator, the
research reports are full of (unchallenged) analysis suggesting that 24/7 Media and
Interliant were volatile investments, and therefore subject to sudden and
substantial devaluation risk.") (citation omitted).
55 Id. at 177. In clarifying the causation requirement applicable to analyst
conflict cases, the Lentell court held:
[W]here (as here) substantial indicia of the risk that materialized are
unambiguously apparent on the face of the disclosures.., a plaintiff must
allege (i) facts sufficient to support an inference that it was defendant's
fraud-rather than other salient factors-that proximately caused
plaintiffs loss; or (ii) facts sufficient to apportion the losses between the
disclosed and concealed portions of the risk that ultimately destroyed an
investment.
Id.
56 The Lentell court emphasized that it was following the holdings of the three
central Second Circuit cases, which establish collectively the circuit's analytical
approach to loss causation. See id. at 173-74.
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Stonepath Group, Inc.;57 Castellano v. Young & Rubicam, Inc. ;58
and Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank59-
while casting considerable doubt on the efficacy of one often-
criticized Second Circuit decision, Marbury Management, Inc. v.
Kohn.6 °
By clarifying the circuit's standard for pleading loss
causation, Lentell reserved its place among the long line of
prodigious Second Circuit decisions wrestling with the
construction and application of the federal securities laws.
Furthermore, Judge Jacobs' sound opinion reserved his place
among the circuit's distinguished securities law jurists, such as
Judges L. Hand, Friendly, Feinberg, Meskill, and Winter.
II. OVERVIEW OF SECURITIES ANALYSTS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:
REGULATORY REFORM, ENSUING ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS, AND A
LITANY OF LITIGATION
In the wake of the scandalous corporate debacles and the
bursting of the thinly walled Internet stock bubble-even after
the promulgation of tomes of disclosure-oriented regulations6
57 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003).
58 257 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2001).
59 250 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2001).
60 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980). The Lentell court unambiguously called into
question the precedential authority of Marbury Management, which it warily
relegated to a clever "but see" citation and expressly failed to mention in a list of
cases that the court stated it was following. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 174.
61 It was the prophetic epigram of Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, made
prior to his tenure on the bench, which set the tenor for the current disclosure-
oriented ethos that pervades the modern securities regulations: "Publicity is justly
commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." LOUIS D. BRANDEIS,
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914). In furtherance of
Brandeis's illustrative metaphor, following the Crash of 1929, the drafters of the
modern securities laws patterned their regulatory philosophy on mandatory
disclosure whereby, at least in principle, material information is disseminated to
investors in an accurate and timely fashion. See Joel Seligman, The Historical Needfor a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (1983) (examining
the arguments made by proponents of the SEC's mandatory corporate disclosure
system).
Our reliance on a system of mandatory disclosure remains the subject of heated
scholarly debate. Many notable, revisionist commentators question the effectiveness
of mandatory disclosure as a panacea and argue that the present disclosure-based
regulations produce few benefits while generating considerable costs. See, e.g.,
George J. Benston, An Appraisal of the Costs and Benefits of Government-Required
Disclosure: SEC and FTC Requirements, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 30, 32-33(1977); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
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Wall Street appeared more volatile than ever.62 The allegations
in Lentell stemmed directly from one of the many hot button
topics rearing its ugly head with the implosion of the technology
stock bubble: the inherent conflicts of interest under which
securities research analysts operate.63 Commentators had long
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 672-73 (1984); Merritt B. Fox, Rethinking
Disclosure Liability in the Modern Era, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 903, 903-05 (1997); George
J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUSINESS 117, 117
(1964).
Conversely, other leading commentators find that the present regulatory
scheme, although far from flawless, helps to enhance the accuracy of market
information and to compensate for market malfunction. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L.
REV. 717, 753 (1984); Dan Seligman, Controversial Solution to the Problem of Stocks
That Implode After Earnings Surprises: Real-Time Financial Reporting, FORBES,
Oct. 30, 2000, at 146 ("Information is critical to the evaluation of risk. The less that
is known about the current state of a market or venture, the less the ability to
project future outcomes and, hence, the more those potential outcomes will be
discounted."' (quoting Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan)).
62 See Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities
Regulation in the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495, 545 (2003)
(explaining how in the 1930s there was a "need to assure against systemic collapses
caused by excessive stock market speculation leading to the... bankruptcy of
numerous financial institutions" and how a very "similar crisis of investor confidence
exists today due to the bursting of the technology stock market bubble and the
corporate financial scandals of Enron Corp. [and] Worldcom"); see also Joseph
Michael Heppt, Note, An Alternative to Throwing Stones: A Proposal for the Reform
of Glass-Steagall, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 281, 316 (1986) ("[A]lthough the modern
markets include numerous securities that were unheard of in 1933, the volatile and
speculative nature of the securities industry ... remains unchanged.").
63 The scope of this Comment cannot even begin to scratch the surface of the
complex issues surrounding securities analysts' conflicts of interest. For a well-
reasoned overview of securities analysts' conflicts of interests and the regulatory
reforms instituted to address them, see Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities
Analyst As Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035
(2003); Gross, supra note 10, at 631-32; Barbara Moses, They Were Shocked,
Shocked: The "Discovery" of Analyst Conflicts on Wall Street, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 89
(2004); Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Response to Professor John Coffee: Analyst Liability
Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1305
(2004); John L. Orcutt, Investor Skepticism v. Investor Confidence: Why the New
Research Analyst Reforms Will Harm Investors, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (2003); Karen
Contoudis, Note, Analyst Conflicts of Interests: Are the NASD and NYSE Rules
Enough?, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 123 (2003); Robert P. Sieland, Note, Caveat
Emptor! After All the Regulatory Hoopla, Securities Analysts Remain Conflicted on
Wall Street, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 531 (2003).
Additionally, there was vast press coverage addressing research analysts'
conflicts of interests. See, e.g., John C. Coffee Jr., Virtue and the Securities Analyst,
N.Y. L.J., July 19, 2001, at 5; Barbara Donnelly, Tough Times for Research Directors,
WALL ST. J., May 28, 1991, at C1 ("Research directors warn that the growing
pressure on research analysts to serve a firm's investment banking and other needs
can lead to serious conflicts of interest. 'It's easy to compromise research in pursuit
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known of the concern that sell-side research analysts issued
overly optimistic recommendations of the securities on which
they were reporting64 because the analysts were significantly
influenced by and wished to curry favor with their firm's
investment banking arm, which in turn wanted to attract more
business to the firm by having analysts issue positive
recommendations of their clients.65 In essence, the analysts did
not want to bite the hand of the investment bankers that fed
them by issuing less than favorable recommendations of their
firm's clients. It was the existence of these cozy, symbiotic
relationships between the theoretically independent research
analysts and the investment banks, which paid the analysts'
steep salaries, that raised many eyebrows.66 Investor frustration
influenced the political barometer, which in turn signaled a
change in the regulatory sea state.
Congress responded to the hue and cry of thwarted investors
and, more importantly, to voters with a rash of regulatory
activism.67 The congressional regulatory response also prompted
of corporate finance, merchant banking or internal money management."' (quoting
Barry Tarasoff, Director of Research, Wertheim Schroder & Co.)); David D.
Kirkpatrick, Coziness Gets Less Comfortable for REITs, Wall Street: Patriot
American's Problems Throw Focus on Possible Conflicts of Interest, WALL ST. J., Nov.
19, 1998, at B10 ("[P]otential conflicts are common on Wall Street.... Securities
analysts who work for investment banks seek to advise investors about stocks but
often have pay packages tied to their own firm's income from underwriting clients.");
Roger Lowenstein, Today's Analyst Often Wears Two Hats, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1996,
at C1 ("The recommendations by underwriter analysts show significant evidence of
bias and possible conflict of interest."') (quoting from a study conducted by Roni
Michaely and Kent L. Womack on the objectivity of underwriters); The Trader's
Lament, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 1999, at 73 ("[A]nalysts' conflicts of interest, already
sharp, will become sharper still. For all the claims that an analyst's worth lies in
investors' perceptions of his independence, few are ever brave enough to put out a
sell recommendation on a firm with which their bank does investment-banking
business.").
64 See Richard A. Rosen, Liability for Optimistic Research Reports Prepared by
Securities Analysts, INSIGHTS, April 2002, at 9 ("The media has pointed to various
statistics that allegedly show that, while the [Nasdaq] composite index was dropping
by 60 percent, less than one percent of analysts' recommendations were to 'sell."').
65 See Moses, supra note 63, at 90 ("No securities regulator should have been
shocked to discover that sell-side equity analysts were joined at the hip to their
investment banking colleagues and that the objectivity of their research suffered as
a result.").
66 See id. at 89-90; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
67 President George W. Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 into law on
July 30, 2002. See Pub L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at various
sections of 11, 15, 18, 25, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). Sarbanes-Oxley mandated additional
disclosure-based regulations as a means of bolstering investor confidence in the
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actions from the self-regulatory organizations (SROs),68 such as
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)69 and the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).7 °
In accord with the ensuing rush of regulatory reform to
address these conflicts of interest, New York State Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer" answered the cries of disenchanted
market and protecting "investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws." Id. § 1, 116 Stat. at 745.
In response to the concern over analysts' conflicts of interest, Title V of
Sarbanes-Oxley amended the Exchange Act with the addition of section 15D, which
required the adoption of "rules reasonably designed to address conflicts of interest
that can arise when securities analysts recommend equity securities in research
reports and public appearances, in order to improve the objectivity of research and
provide investors with more useful and reliable information." Id. § 501, 116 Stat. at
791 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6(a)).
68 Section 3(a)(26) of the Exchange Act defines the term "self-regulatory
organization." See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (2000). Self-regulatory organizations, such
as the NYSE and NASD, are authorized pursuant to sections 6, 15A, 19, and 23 of
the Exchange Act to institute their own rules and regulations governing the
operation of their respective exchanges. See id. §§ 78f, 780-3, 78s, 78w; see also 3
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE
LAW § 1:198 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the NYSE and NASD reaction to problem with
conflicted securities analysts). But see Contoudis, supra note 63, at 148 (positing
that these new analyst rules may be ineffective to address the scope of the problem);
Sieland, supra note 63, at 566-69 ("The new NASD and NYSE Rules, overall, strike
an appropriate balance between protecting investors and protecting the viability of
the analyst profession-but they are not the ideal.").
69 The NYSE filed with the SEC amendments to NYSE Rule 472,
Communications with the Public, as a means of addressing analyst conflicts of
interest with stock exchange members by requiring the mandatory disclosure of such
conflicts and instituting rules to minimize analyst conflicts. See Self Regulatory
Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes By the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. Relating to Exchange Rules 344, 345A, 351 and 472 and by the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst
Conflicts of Interest and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval
of Amendment No. 3 to the Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange,
Inc. and Amendment No. 3 to the Proposed Rule Change by the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest, 68 Fed.
Reg. 45,875 (Aug. 4, 2003).
70 The NASD also filed with the Commission NASD Rule 2711, Research
Analyst and Research Reports, a much broader and more comprehensive analyst
conflict regulation. See id. This new rule amended and superseded the existing
NASD Rule 2210, Communications with the Public. See id.
"' Although lacking the infamy of Aaron Burr, Eliot Spitzer is arguably one of
New York's most proactive and aggressive Attorneys General. For an interesting
historical perspective of the Office of the New York Attorney General, see Philip
Weinberg, Office of N.Y Attorney General Sets Pace for Others Nationwide, N.Y. ST.
B.J., June 2004, at 10. "'The behavior of competitors in a free market must be guided
by a government that defines boundaries of ethics, fair dealing and disclosure.... It
is our obligation to find that boundary line to preserve the free market."' John
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investors by making application under the archaic Martin Act 72
for an ex parte order enjoining Merrill Lynch from issuing
analyst reports and ordering certain disclosures. 73  The ensuing
investigation and disclosure demands resulted in a $100 million
settlement by Merrill Lynch.74 With the scent of blood in the air,
Spitzer also sounded the charge in a cooperative effort with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), investigating
analyst practices at ten leading Wall Street firms.75  This joint
enforcement action yielded a settlement award of $1.4 billion,
and drafted a blueprint for shoring the firms' defunct "Chinese
walls '76 and for patching the sizeable cracks that undermined the
Caher, Market Needs Rules, Spitzer Tells State Bar, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 27, 2005, at 1(quoting Eliot Spitzer during his acceptance speech for the Stanley H. Fuld Awardgiven to him by the New York State Bar Association on Commercial and Federal
Litigation).
72 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 352, 354 (McKinney 1996). Codified in 1909, the
Martin Act is a New York State blue-sky law, which defines securities fraud in farbroader terms than the federal securities laws thus providing the New York StateAttorney General with an expansively liberal arsenal of securities fraud
investigative and prosecutorial authority. See id.
" See Aff. in Supp. of Application for an Order Pursuant to General Business
Law Section 354 at 2-3, In re Inquiry by Eliot Spitzer (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 8, 2002)(No. 02-401522), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aprfMerrilIL.pdf
[hereinafter Dinallo Affidavit]; Order Pursuant to General Business Law Section354, In re Inquiry by Eliot Spitzer at 1-2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 8, 2002) (No. 02-
401522), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2OO2/apr/aprO8b 02
attach.pdf; see also Kip Betz & Rachel McTague, Broker Dealers: N.Y Court Stays
Order Requiring Merrill Lynch To Disclose Rating Systems, 34 SEC. REG. & L. REP.(BNA) 610 (Apr. 15, 2002).
74 This Martin Act inquiry resulted in a $100 million settlement agreement and
a pact implementing the overhaul of Merrill Lynch's flawed analyst screeningprocedures. See Agreement Between the Att'y General of the State of New York and
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (May 21, 2002), available athttp://www.oag.state.ny.us/investors/ merrill agreement.pdf; Press Release, OFFICE
OF N.Y. STATE ATTrY GEN. ELIOT SPITZER, Spitzer, Merrill Lynch ReachUnprecedented Agreement To Reform Investment Practices (May 21, 2002),
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2OO2/may/may21a_02.html.
75 See Phyllis Diamond et al., Broker Dealers: Wall St. Agrees to $1.4 Billion
Payment, Broad Reforms, Resolving Conflict Changes, 34 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)2037 (Dec. 23, 2002); Press Release, OFFICE OF N.Y. STATE ATT'y GEN. ELIOTSPITZER, SEC, NY Attorney General, NASD, NASAA, NYSE and State Regulators
Announce Historic Agreement To Reform Investment Practices (Dec. 20, 2002),
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/ dec/dec20b_02.html; Att'y Gen.Eliot Spitzer, Statement Regarding the "Global Resolution" of Wall Street
Investigations (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/
statements/global resolution.html.
76 Investment firms that both advise clients and underwrite securities utilize
what have come to be known as "Chinese walls" or internal, written proceduresdesigned to insulate the analysts from underwriters in order to prevent, or at least
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systems that theoretically insulated research analysts from the
objectivity-defeating effect of underwriter oversight.77
Eliot Spitzer's adept wielding of the enforcement sword led
many investors, or rather their class action lawyers, to file
federal securities fraud complaints similar to those in Lentell.
71
The gravamen of the allegations in Lentell was based
substantially, if not entirely, on Eliot Spitzer's probe into analyst
practices at Merrill Lynch.7 9 As such, the Lentell plaintiffs
claimed "that the analyst opinions expressed in the research
reports were materially misleading,""° and that "the analysts
misrepresented their true opinions in the reports ... and did not
disclose certain alleged conflicts of interest within the Merrill
Lynch brokerage house.81
Although setting forth egregious behavior by Merrill Lynch's
analysts, their complaints failed to satisfy the Second Circuit's
interpretation of the PSLRA's requirements for adequately
pleading actionable securities fraud8 2  The following section
details the stringent pleading standards-ultimately clarified by
Lentell-that are applicable in the torrent of analysts' conflicts
cases filed in federal court.
limit, conflicts of interest. See generally Martin Lipton & Robert B. Mazur, The
Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV.
459, 459 (1975) (recommending a "reinforced Chinese Wall-strengthened in certain
situations to prevent abuse; flexible in others to preserve market liquidity; adaptable
in every instance").
77 See Diamond et al., supra note 75, at 2037.
78 See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 164-65 (2d Cir. 2005)
("Within weeks, some 140 class-action complaints were filed, relying on the NYAG's
application to allege securities fraud in connection with Merrill Lynch's analyses and
investment recommendations .... ); see also Susanne Craig, Wall Street Braces for
Bad-Research Claims, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2003, at C1 (stating that a "barrage" of
private, class-action litigation has been spurred by a recent $1.4 billion settlement
Wall Street firms made with securities regulators); Brooke A. Masters & Ben White,
Wall St. Facing Legal Blitz; 'Global' Settlement Prompts Investor to File Claims,
WASH. POST, July 3, 2003, at El ("Regulators said earlier this year that the details
released in the Wall Street settlement could serve as a road map for shareholders
wishing to pursue lawsuits.").
79 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 164; In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec.
Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("In support of the fraud allegations,
plaintiffs rely almost exclusively on, and quote heavily from, an
affidavit ... [detailing] the efforts of the New York Attorney General to investigate
defendants' internet research group.").
so See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 164; Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 359.
8" See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 164; Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 360.
82 Lentell, 396 F.3d at 169 ("[S]uch pleading does not suffice to plead federal
securities fraud.").
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III. THE LENTELL COURT REINVIGORATES AND CLARIFIES THE
SECOND CIRCUIT'S REQUIREMENTS FOR TRIGGERING INQUIRY
NOTICE AND PLEADING LOSS CAUSATION UNDER THE PSLRA
In a legislative attempt to reduce the number of frivolous
securities fraud cases and strike suits brought in federal court,
Congress proposed instituting considerable statutory hurdles for
plaintiff classes seeking relief under the securities laws'
antifraud provisions.83 Congress's grand design came to fruition
with the passage of the PSLRA.8 4  This amendment to the
Exchange Act advanced Congress's assault on strike suits by
placing the following Herculean requirements on plaintiffs
pleading a cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5:85
(1) a plaintiff must specify each allegedly false statement or
omission with particularity;86 (2) a plaintiff must plead and prove
83 See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 730 (stating there was "significant evidence" that litigation based
on the antifraud provisions of the securities laws had been "undermined
by... abusive and meritless suits ... whenever there is a significant change in an
issuer's stock price"); S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
679, 683 (discussing that Congress's intention for drafting the PSLRA was "to lower
the cost of raising capital by combatting [litigation] abuses, while maintaining the
incentive for bringing meritorious actions").
For an engaging discussion of the legislative process leading up to the passage of
the PSLRA, see Avery, supra note 20, at 336 (stating that although Congress's
original concern was with the "explosion of meritless securities lawsuits, particularly
class actions, filed solely for their settlement value," the Reform Act "extends far
beyond frivolous litigation," including "measures that significantly alter the
treatment of meritorious claims, as well as frivolous ones").
8 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also Charles T. Williams, III, Comment, Semerenko v.
Cendant Corp: Has the Time Come To Prune the "Judicial Oak"?, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L.
587, 591 (2002) ("With the passage of the PSLRA in 1995, Congress reinforced a
restrictive interpretation of Rule 10b-5.").
85 In broad terms, in order "[t]o state a cause of action under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must plead that the defendant made a false statement or
omitted a material fact, with scienter, and that plaintiffs reliance on defendant's
action caused plaintiff injury." Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2001)(quoting San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris
Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also, e.g., In re IBM Corp. Sec. Litig., 163
F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1998) (outlining the requirements for stating a claim under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
86 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2000). This section of the PSLRA is entitled
'Misleading Statements and Omissions" and it provides:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant-
(A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
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that the defendant acted with the requisite state of mind;87 and
(3) a plaintiff must plead and prove "loss causation."" In
addition to these arduous pleading obstacles, plaintiffs must
contend with the brusque statute of limitations for section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 claims.89
statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were
made, not misleading;
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if
an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information
and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which
that belief is formed.
Id. (emphasis added); see Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1995)
("We have stated that 'the complaint must: (1) specify the statements that the
plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and
when the statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements were
fraudulent."'(quoting Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d
Cir.1993))).
87 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (providing that "[iun any private action arising
under this chapter... with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this
chapter, [the complaint must] state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind").
The requisite state of mind is scienter, which is an "intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
A plaintiff must establish intent "either (a) by alleging facts to show that defendants
had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (b) by alleging facts that
constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness."
Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Acito, 47 F.3d at 52
(quoting Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994))); see
also IBM Corp. Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d at 107 (addressing that a statement of opinion
may be actionable only if it is "supported by specific statements of fact [that are
false], or if the speaker does not genuinely or reasonably believe them").
88 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (providing that "[iln any private action arising
under this chapter, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or
omission of the defendant alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss for which
the plaintiff seeks to recover damages") (emphasis added); see also Michael J.
Kaufman, Loss Causation: Exposing a Fraud on Securities Law Jurisprudence, 24
IND. L. REV. 357, 358 (1991) (discussing the Second Circuit's original definition of
loss causation in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir.
1974)).
89 The Supreme Court in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), borrowed the one-year limitations period from
section 9(e) of the Exchange Act to claims brought under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5, even though neither of those provisions originally contained an express statute of
limitations. See id. at 364. Section 9(e) of the Exchange Act states in relevant part
that "[n]o action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this
section, unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting
the violation and within three years after such violation." 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e). After
the August 29, 2002 effective date of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the statute of
limitations was increased to two years after discovery and to five years after the
violation. See Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 804, 116 Stat. 745, 801 (amending 28 U.S.C. §
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The circuit's decision in Lentell alleviated much of the
academic, judicial, and practicing bar's debate over two critical
elements of the PSLRA: the requirements for triggering the
inquiry notice provision of the statute of limitations9" and the
requisite standard for pleading and proving loss causation in
analyst conflict cases.91 The Lentell court's careful analysis of
these statutory provisions will hopefully obviate future confusion
surrounding their application, not only in the Second Circuit but,
moreover, in the various district and circuit courts where
Lentell's highly persuasive doctrinal guidance merges with the
Supreme Court's recent loss causation pronouncement in Dura
Pharmaceuticals. 92
A. Inquiry Notice: Lentell Reaffirms that Non-Detailed "Storm
Warnings"Are Insufficient To Trigger the Inquiry Notice
Provision of the Statute of Limitations
One of the decisive issues on appeal in Lentell was whether
the plaintiffs' claims-irrespective of the heightened pleading
requirements mandated by the PSLRA-were time-barred under
the judicially imposed, one-year statute of limitations. 93 The
question on appeal focused on whether the plaintiffs were placed
on inquiry notice of their fraud claims by the plethora of
"judicially-noticeable"94  press coverage concerning analyst
1658).
90 See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 168-72 (2d Cir. 2005).
9' See id. at 172-78.
92 The split in the circuits over the proper loss caution standard led the
Supreme Court, under advisement from the Solicitor General, to grant certiorari in
Broudo v. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 124 S. Ct. 2904 (2004). See Neil M. Gorsuch & Paul B. Matey, No Loss, No
Gain: The Supreme Court Should Make Clear That Securities Fraud Claims Can't
Dodge the Element of Causation, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005, at 52. Justice Breyer,
delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, squarely
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's artificial price inflation theory, hence quelling the
circuit split over the fundamental loss causation requirement. See Dura Pharms.,
Inc. v. Broudo, No. 03-932, 2005 WL 885109 (U.S. April 19, 2005), at *1, 125 S. Ct.
1627 (2005).
9' See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 167-72; In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports
Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 378-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (containing the lower court's
analysis of the inquiry notice prong under the statute of limitations).
9 Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 382, 383 n.3 ("[O]n a motion to dismiss, a
court may consider. . . 'matters as to which judicial notice may be taken .. "'
(alteration in original) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153
(2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Brass v Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir.
1993))).
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conflicts of interest.95 In a painstakingly detailed analysis, the
circuit found that the plaintiffs were not placed on inquiry notice
of their fraud claims based on generalized, industry-wide "storm
warnings" of analyst conflicts reported by the financial press.96
The Lentell court held that more particularized detail, such as
issuer-specific data, was required for triggering inquiry notice,
but the court cautiously left the requisite level of specificity and
detail mostly undefined. 97
Although the antifraud provisions did not originally contain
an express statute of limitations, the Supreme Court
incorporated by reference a one-year statute of limitations to
claims brought under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the
Exchange Act. 98 The Court borrowed the statute of limitations
from section 9(e) of the Exchange Act.99 A plaintiff triggered this
brief, one-year statute of limitations by either "obtain[ing] actual
knowledge of the facts giving rise to the action,"' ' ° or by being
placed on inquiry notice such that "in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, [the plaintiff] should have discovered the facts
underlying the alleged fraud."' '
As in most securities fraud cases, the application of the
95 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 167-72.
96 See id. at 170.
Conflicts of interest present opportunities for fraud, but they do not,
standing alone, evidence fraud .... Nor does the existence of temptation
trigger a duty of inquiry-at least, not by a reasonable investor. Something
more than conflicted interest is required, no matter how well publicized the
conflict may be.
Id.
97 See id. at 169; see also Flumenbaum & Karp, supra note 19.
98 See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,
364 (1991).
99 See id. at 364 n.9 .
0 LC Capital Partners, LP v. Frontier Ins. Group, Inc., 318 F.3d 148, 154 (2d
Cir. 2003) (quoting Kahn v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., 970 F.2d 1030, 1042
(2d Cir. 1992)).
10l Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Sterlin v.
Biomune Sys., 154 F.3d 1191, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998)); see also Newman v. Warnaco
Group, Inc., 335 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2003) ('"[W]hen the circumstances would
suggest to an investor of ordinary intelligence the probability that she has been
defrauded, a duty of inquiry arises .... ' (quoting Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d
346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993))); LC Capital Partners, 318 F.3d at 155 (stating that courts
will look to public information, such as the financial press or other news sources, to
see if the plaintiff was on inquiry notice of its claims); Dodds, 12 F.3d at 350 (noting
that the statute of limitations is triggered "when a reasonable investor of ordinary
intelligence would have discovered the existence of the fraud").
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inquiry notice provision was implicated in Lentell.'0 2  Courts
within the Second Circuit ran the gamut as to what they deemed
to be sufficient inquiry notice to commence running of the statute
of limitations.' °3 The resulting confusion was alleviated, in part,
by a series of Second Circuit decisions establishing some
consensus on the appropriate level of "notice."1°4  In the lower
court's opinion, however, Judge Pollack found that the Lentell
plaintiffs' complaints were time-barred based on the extensive
amount of press coverage that analyst conflicts of interest
received in the financial press.' 5  The plaintiffs moved for
reconsideration of the district court's dismissal on statute of
limitations grounds in light of an influential Second Circuit
decision, Newman v. Warnaco Group, Inc.,'0 6 which was reported
102 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 168 ("[W]e can readily resolve the issue [of inquiry
notice] on a motion to dismiss, and have done so in 'a vast number of cases."' (citing
LC Capital Partners, 318 F.3d at 156 (quoting Dodds, 12 F.3d at 352 n.3)).
103 There are many examples demonstrating how some courts within the Second
Circuit have recently, as well as historically, applied the inquiry notice provision.
See, e.g., Levitt v. Bear Stearns & Co., 340 F.3d 94, 102-04 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding
that plaintiffs were not placed on inquiry notice based on a complaint filed in federal
court in Texas or the statement of claim filed in an NASD arbitration); Newman, 335
F.3d at 193-94 (finding that the plaintiffs were not placed on inquiry notice by
defendant's filing of a revised Form 10-K); LC Capital Partners, 318 F.3d at 155
(finding that adequate "storm warnings" did exist based on reports of substantial
reserve problems and pending litigation in the Eastern District of New York); In re
Ames Dep't Stores, Inc. Note Litig., 991 F.2d 968, 979-81 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that
the statute of limitations was not triggered for debt-security holders by press
coverage of concerns over the company's equity securities); In re Initial Pub. Offering
Sec. Litig., 341 F. Supp. 2d 328, 347-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding that press reports
of IPO pricing concerns did not place the plaintiffs on inquiry notice); Fogarazzo v.
Lehman Bros., Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 274, 299-300 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding that
media reports of analyst conflicts of interest did not give rise to inquiry notice); In re
Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 431, 447-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that
press releases of possible corporate fraud did not constitute storm warning sufficient
to give rise to the duty of inquiry); In re Executive Telecard, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 913 F.
Supp. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that information contained in public SEC
filings did not put the plaintiffs on inquiry notice of the falsity of audited financial
statements); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. '21' Int'l Holdings, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 212,
222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that analyst reports placed the plaintiffs on inquiry
notice of a looming corporate write-off).
'04 See, e.g., Levitt, 340 F.3d at 101; Newman, 335 F.3d at 193.
105 See In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d
351, 378-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (squaring its statute of limitations dismissal on the
standard applied in LC Capital Partners, 318 F.3d at 153-55, as well as other
Southern District of New York decisions, in which plaintiffs' complaints were
dismissed as time-barred based on inquiry notice of "potential fraud").
'06 335 F.3d at 194 (holding that the plaintiffs were not placed on inquiry notice
of possible fraud by the defendant based on the defendant's filing of a revised annual
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after Judge Pollack rendered his initial decision.'17 Yet again,
the district court relied on the extensive, although non-stock
specific, press coverage of industry-wide analyst conflicts of
interest in support of its conclusion that the plaintiffs were
placed on inquiry notice of their fraud claims; hence, the district
court denied reconsideration of its dismissal on statute of
limitations grounds.'08
The panel in Lentell, reversing on the statute of limitations
grounds, was unwilling to extend the inquiry notice provision
with the same breadth that the district court felt was proper.0 9
Notably, the circuit followed the straightforward analysis
employed in Newman and Levitt v. Bear Stearns & Co.,"' which
tempered the reach of inquiry notice to only instances where the
data "'relates directly to the misrepresentations and omissions'
that plaintiffs allege against Merrill Lynch.""' The circuit
remarked that the scores of articles cited by the district court in
support of its conclusion that inquiry notice was established did
not specifically mention either of the Internet companies at issue
in Lentell."l2 The circuit found it unreasonable to hold that the
one-year statute of limitations was triggered for every company
recommended in a Merrill Lynch report by press releases
generally discussing analysts' conflicts at Merrill Lynch.' The
SEC report, Form 10-K).
107 In an attempt to counteract the influence of the recent Second Circuit
decision in Newman, and in response to plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration under
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Pollack cited numerous
press releases spanning the panoply of press coverage on the issue of analysts'
conflicts of interest, including the Wall Street Journal, Boston Globe, Business Week,
Crain's New York Business, The Economist, Fortune, and The Washington Post. See
Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 383-88.
108 See id. at 389-90, 394.
'09 See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2005) ("The
articles relied upon to support that [inquiry notice was triggered] fall well short of
the specificity required to prompt further inquiry by a reasonable investor.").
"0 340 F.3d 94, 102-04 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiffs were not placed on
inquiry notice based on a complaint filed in federal court in Texas or the statement
of claim filed in an NASD arbitration); Newman, 335 F.3d at 193-94 (finding that
the plaintiffs were not placed on inquiry notice by the defendant's filing of a revised
Form 10-K).
. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 169 (alteration in original) (quoting Newman, 335
F.3d at 193); see also Flumenbaum & Karp, supra note 19.
112 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 171 ("However, [the article] says nothing about 24/7
Media or Interliant; neither company is mentioned in any article relied upon by the
district court.").
113 See id.
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race to timely file securities fraud complaints would occur at the
expense of "the level of particularity in pleading required by the
PSLRA,,1 14 thus thwarting Congress's intent behind drafting the
PSLRA.115  Lentell also cautioned that since much of the
information relied on in the complaints was discovered as a
result of Eliot Spitzer's investigation, the court would not
'"punish [a] pleader for waiting until the appropriate factual
information [has been] gathered by dismissing the complaint as
time-barred."
1 16
By clearing away much of the fog that surrounded prior
courts' application of inquiry notice, it is submitted that the
Lentell court reinserted the oft-missing variables of
reasonableness117 and fact-specific inquiry118 back into the inquiry
notice equation. Generalized "storm warnings," no matter how
prolific, on sweeping, market-wide issues like analysts' conflicts
of interests do not place the reasonable investor on inquiry notice
of specific instances of securities fraud in the companies in which
they hold stock.11 9 The circuit held that issuer-specific detail is
necessary. But what quantum of detail is required?
Regrettably, the Lentell panel skirted this question,
providing little guidance on the extent to which the information
must be directly related to the alleged fraud before the inquiry
notice provision is triggered. 120 By warily leaving this follow-up
question open-ended, practitioners will inevitably seek further
instruction from the bench.1 21 It seems axiomatic, however, to
suggest that each instance of purported securities fraud requires
a thorough, fact-specific examination by both counsel and the
court to see if inquiry notice was implicated. Yet, this Comment
suggests that this seemingly obvious approach is exactly what
the Lentell court suggests. Lentell did not impart an inflexible,
114 Id.
115 See id.
116 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Levitt v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 340
F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2003)).
"' See Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that
the inquiry notice standard is based on the objective standard of when a reasonable
investor of ordinary intelligence would have discovered the existence of the fraud).
11 See Levitt, 340 F.3d at 102-04 (requiring that courts engage in a fact-specific
inquiry when examining whether a plaintiff "could have" learned of the facts giving
rise to the alleged fraud).
19 See id.; Newman v. Warnaco Group, Inc., 335 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 2003).
2' See Flumenbaum & Karp, supra note 19.
121 See id.
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bright line rule on inquiry notice. Rather, it provided yet another
example, albeit a persuasive one, of facts and circumstances
surrounding a typical conflicted analyst case that did not satisfy
the inquiry notice threshold.
The Second Circuit, via the progeny of decisions following
Newman, insists that district courts conduct a careful, fact-
specific examination of the available information to see if inquiry
notice was implicated by way of particularized, issuer-specific
data that would place a reasonable investor on inquiry notice of
potential securities fraud.1 22 This Comment posits that Lentell
made one of the sizable barriers that Congress erected under the
PSLRA-the inquiry notice trigger to the statute of limitations-
appear surmountable for similarly situated plaintiffs.
Consequently, securities fraud plaintiffs could breathe a sigh of
relief-well, at least until they encountered the next arduous
hurdle: loss causation.
B. Loss Causation: Lentell Clarifies the Second Circuit's
Stringent Standard for Adequately Pleading Loss Causation
Under the PSLRA
The second, and more influential, issue on appeal dealt with
the hotly contested topic of loss causation. 123  The question on
appeal essentially turned on whether the pleadings established
that the alleged misrepresentations or omissions-Merrill
Lynch's failure to disclose its analysts' conflicts of interest-
caused the losses suffered by the plaintiffs.1 24 In holding that the
pleadings did not pass muster under the Second Circuit's
22 See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 170-72 (2d Cir. 2005).
123 See id. at 172-78. The standard for pleading loss causation was the subject of
a feverously debated circuit split. See Joseph M. McLaughlin, Directors' and Officers'
Liability; What Is at Stake in Dura" N.Y. L.J., Oct. 14, 2004, at 5. As a result of the
split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a Ninth Circuit case, Broudo v. Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2904
(2004), to consider whether plaintiffs "must demonstrate loss causation by pleading
and proving a causal connection between the alleged fraud and the investment's
subsequent decline in price." McLaughlin, supra, at 5.
As predicted by Mr. McLaughlin, as well as many other leading securities law
scholars, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Eighth and Ninth Circuit's artificial
price inflation theory, siding instead with the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuit's requirement for a causal link between the fraud and the drop in price. See
Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, No. 03-932, 2005 WL 885109 (U.S. April 19, 2005), at
*1, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005).
124 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 172.
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precedents narrowly interpreting the PSLRA's loss causation
provision, the Lentell court clarified many of its prior, less than
lucid, opinions dealing with loss causation 25  and, perhaps
implicitly, negated the efficacy of a questionable earlier decision,
Marbury Management.2 6 Simultaneously, the circuit raised the
pleading bar in analyst conflicts cases to the level originally
intended by Congress.127  Arguably, Lentell's reasoning on the
issue of loss causation will receive far more scholarly criticism
than its guidance on inquiry notice. It is submitted, however,
that Judge Jacobs' sound loss causation analysis in Lentell,
although not cited by the Court, served as one of the
jurisprudential guideposts utilized by the Supreme Court in the
much-anticipated Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo decision.
1 21
The indispensable element of causation under the federal
securities laws was judge-made 29 and was principally bottomed
in tort law theory.3 ° As a pioneer in the realm of securities
125 See Flumenbaum & Karp, supra note 19 ("In Lentell, the court rationalized
and clarified its loss causation jurisprudence-which had been, in the court's own
words, 'somewhat inconsistent'.... Much of the confusion that has long been
associated with loss causation was stripped away by the court's forceful and
unvarnished opinion in Lentell.").
126 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980). The circuit unambiguously called into question
the precedential authority of the often-criticized decision of Marbury Management,
which it warily relegated to a clever "but see" citation and expressly failed to
mention the case in a list of cases that the Lentell court stated it was following. See
Lentell, 396 F.3d at 174; see also Flumenbaum & Karp, supra note 19 ("The court
also appeared implicitly to overrule the long-controversial 1980 opinion in Marbury
Management, Inc. v. Kohn, dismissing it with a 'but see' citation at the end of its
analysis ... ").
127 See Flumenbaum & Karp, supra note 19 (arguing that the Lentell court
"established a formidable barrier to pleading a claim based on alleged research
analyst conflicts of interest and securities fraud claims generally").
28 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, No. 03-932,
2005 WL 885109 (U.S. April 19, 2005), at *1, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005).
129 See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974).
One article pinpoints the origination of the well-known terms "transaction
causation" and 'loss causation" to a Note in the Yale Law Journal. See Jay W.
Eisenhofer et al., Securities Fraud, Stock Price Valuation, and Loss Causation:
Toward A Corporate Finance-Based Theory of Loss Causation, 59 Bus. LAW. 1419,
1429 n.52 (2004) (citing Note, Causation and Liability in Private Actions for Proxy
Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107, 117 (1970)).
30 See Escoffery, supra note 20, at 1793 & n.l15, 1794 n.128 (illustrating how
persuasively tort law concepts and the "notions of common law fraud" have affected
the antifraud provisions of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); see also Margaret V.
Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 10b-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs
Be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 96, 96 (1985) (explaining that "litigation
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5 is at
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litigation, the Second Circuit was first to establish that plaintiffs
must plead and prove two separate, yet related, causation
elements: transaction causation and loss causation.1
3
'
Transaction causation, or "but for" causation in fact, can be
equated to the common law fraud concept of reliance,1 3 1 while loss
causation, the far more subtle stepchild of causation, is arguably
analogous to the tort concept of proximate or legal causation."3
Judge Winter's dissent in AUSA Life Insurance Co. v. Ernst and
Young134-which draws largely from Cardozo's famed proximate
causation characterization of the "zone of danger"-demonstrates
just how illustratively ingrained tort law concepts have become
in the Second Circuit's approach to causation, especially loss
causation. 131
To establish transaction causation, a plaintiff must show
that but for the defendant's alleged fraud, she would not have
present riddled with tort law doctrines").
131 See Schlick, 507 F.2d at 380; see also Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-
Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) ("It is settled that causation under
federal securities laws is two-pronged: a plaintiff must allege both transaction
causation.., and loss causation .... ).
132 See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 2005)
('"Transaction causation is akin to reliance, and requires only an allegation that 'but
for the claimed misrepresentations or omissions, the plaintiff would not have
entered into the detrimental securities transaction."' (quoting Emergent Capital Inv.
Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2003))).133 The Fifth Circuit decision of Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d
534 (5th Cir. 1981), afrd in part and rev'd in part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983), is credited
for first expounding on the current requirements for loss causation by holding that
"[t]he causation requirement is satisfied... only if the misrepresentation touches
upon the reasons for the investment's decline in value." Id. at 549. Loss causation is
defined as "the causal link between the alleged misconduct and the economic harm
ultimately suffered by the plaintiff." Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 197; see Lentell,
396 F.3d at 172-73 ("We have described loss causation in terms of the tort-law
concept of proximate cause, i.e., 'that the damages suffered by plaintiff must be a
foreseeable consequence of any misrepresentation or material omission,' but the tort
analogy is imperfect.") (citations omitted). But see Michael J. Kaufman, supra note
88, at 358-59 (arguing that loss causation has led to courts denying plaintiffs any
damages when they cannot prove that the defendants' conduct caused all of their
losses).
134 206 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000).
... See id. at 235 (Winter, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Chief Judge Winter
wrote the following:
If the significance of the truth is such as to cause a reasonable investor to
consider seriously a zone of risk that would be perceived as remote or
highly unlikely by one believing the fraud, and the loss ultimately suffered
is within that zone, then a misrepresentation or omission as to that
information may be deemed a foreseeable or proximate cause of the loss.
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bought the security in question. 13 6 A rebuttable presumption of
transaction causation can be established using the fraud on the
market theory advanced in the watershed securities case Basic
Inc. v. Levinson.'37 Transaction causation, however, is merely
one part of the causation puzzle. A successful plaintiff must also
establish the more obscure loss causation element by illustrating
"the causal link between the alleged misconduct and the
economic harm ultimately suffered by the plaintiff."'38 The loss
causation requirement attempts to 'fix a legal limit on a person's
responsibility, even for wrongful acts.""'3 9 Many plaintiffs, like
those in Lentell, bound over the transaction causation prong 4 °just to founder on the unforgiving rocks of this nebulous loss
136 See Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 197 ("[B]ut for the claimed
misrepresentations or omissions, the plaintiff would not have entered into the
detrimental securities transaction.").
13' 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
"The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open
and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is
determined by the available material information .... Misleading
statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the
purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements."
Id. at 241-42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986)); see also
Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with RelianceRequirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435 (1984)(tracing the development of the fraud on the market theory as well as examining
objections to the theory); Barbara Black, The Strange Case of Fraud on the Market: ALabel in Search of a Theory, 52 ALB. L. REV. 923, 926 (1988) (arguing that the
Supreme Court in Basic left open the possibility that a pure causation approach is
an appropriate explanation of fraud on the market); Michael A. Lynn, Note, Fraud
on the Market: An Emerging Theory of Recovery Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 50 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 627 (1982) (exploring the development of the fraud on the market
theory of civil liability under rule 10b-5); Mark H. Van De Voorde, Note, The Fraud
on the Market Theory and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis: Applying a Consistent
Standard, 14 J. CORP. L. 443 (1989) (explaining the fraud on the market theory).138 Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 197; see also Lentell, 396 F.3d at 174 ("[O]urprecedents make clear that loss causation has to do with the relationship between
the plaintiffs investment loss and the information misstated or concealed by thedefendant." (citing Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 198-99; Castellano v. Young &
Rubicam, Inc., 257 F.3d 171, 186-90 (2d Cir. 2001); Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v.
Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 96-98 (2d Cir. 2001))).
139 Castellano, 257 F.3d at 186 (quoting First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding
Corp, 27 F.3d 763, 769 (2d Cir. 1994)).
140 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 172 ("Plaintiffs do not claim to have read Merrill's
reports, or to have bought 24/7 Media or Interliant securities through the Firm;
instead, they rely on the fraud-on-the-market presumption blessed in Basic v.Levinson. We assume for present purposes that the allegations could amount to a
fraud on the market.") (citation omitted).
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causation standard.
141
Further confounding the inherent complexity in these
causation requirements, the hallowed halls of 40 Foley Square, 42
by way of a trilogy of recent decisions,"' imposed the additional
tort law concept of foreseeability 1" and the Seventh Circuit's
"materialization of the risk"'' 45 constraint into its loss causation
equation. To establish foreseeability the court examines whether
it was reasonably foreseeable that the alleged misrepresentation
or omission would lead to the market devaluation causing a
plaintiffs loss. 46  On the other hand, to establish
"materialization of the risk," a plaintiff must show that the "loss
was caused by the materialization of a risk that was undisclosed
because of the defendant's fraud. 1 47  One facet of Lentell's
importance is that the circuit made abundantly clear that both of
these prerequisites-foreseeability and the materialization of
risk-remain viable in the Second Circuit's approach to loss
causation.1 48  As a result, it is suggested that the circuit's
141 See id. at 177 (concluding that the dismissal of the complaint was proper
under a failure to adequately plead loss causation, as the plaintiffs "offer no factual
basis to support the allegation that Merrill's misrepresentations and omissions
caused the losses flowing from the well-disclosed volatility of securities issued by
24/7 Media and Interliant").
142 The current building address for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit is 40 Foley Square, although the court is actually located at 40
Centre Street. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND CIRCUIT, Travel Directions, at
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/ CourtMap.htm#directions (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).
Foley Square, as well as the other surrounding courthouses and government
buildings, were built over the infamous Five Points section of lower Manhattan. See
NYC-Architecture.com, The U.S. Courthouse, at http://www.nyc-architecture.com/
SCC/SCC021.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).
143 See Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 196-98; Castellano, 257 F.3d at 190; Suez
Equity Investors, 250 F.3d at 96-98 (holding that loss causation was met because
"the defendants' misrepresentations induced a disparity between the transaction
price and the true 'investment quality' of the securities at the time of transaction").
'" See, e.g., Castellano, 257 F.3d at 186; First Nationwide Bank, 27 F.3d at 769;
Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489, 1495 (2d Cir. 1992).
141 See, e.g., Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 684-86 (7th Cir. 1990);
Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716-23 (2d Cir. 1980) (Meskill, J.,
dissenting).
146 See Castellano, 257 F.3d at 190 ("[F]oreseeablity links the omitted
information and the ultimate injury in this case .... "); First Nationwide Bank, 27
F.3d at 769; Citibank, 968 F.2d at 1495 (holding that a plaintiff must show that the
loss was the "foreseeable consequence" of the defendant's misrepresentations or
omissions).
147 Escoffery, supra note 20, at 1803, 1804 n.207 (citing Judge Posner's opinion
in Bastian as the origin of the materialization of the risk approach).
141 See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005). In
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reaffirmation of its post-Suez precedents in Lentell quelled much
of the debate surrounding the import of these somewhat
amorphous loss causation factors. This, in turn, offered little
solace to plaintiffs' class action lawyers struggling with these
concepts, yet provided significant fodder for the cannons of the
securities defense bar. 4
9
It goes without saying that courts must look to Congress's
statutory intentions when construing the securities laws, or any
other law for that matter. 50 Congress, however, looked instead
to the courts, particularly to the Second Circuit, for guidance in
drafting the PSLRA.15" ' As a result, Congress codified much of
affirming the circuit's prior decision in Suez Equity Investors, although arguably
limiting the breadth of its application, the Lentell court stated:
We acknowledge that the pleading principles set out in the foregoing
passage require both that the loss be foreseeable and that the loss be
caused by the materialization of the concealed risk; and we further
acknowledge that our opinion in Suez Equity can be (mis-)read to say that
this Circuit has rejected the "materialization of risk" approach....
This Court's cases-post-Suez and pre-Suez-require both that the loss be
foreseeable and that the loss be caused by the materialization of the
concealed risk.
Id. at 173 (citing Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 197-98; Castellano, 257 F.3d at 188,
190; Suez Equity Investors, 250 F.3d at 97, 98 n.1; First Nationwide Bank, 27 F.3d at
769; Citibank, 968 F.2d at 1495); see also AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206
F.3d 202, 235 (2d Cir. 2000) (Winter, J., dissenting).
' Hamblett, supra note 19 (commenting that Lentell "raises the bar high for
suits based on analyst recommendations and jeopardizes dozens of such actions
against Merrill Lynch").
"'O See Sachs, supra note 130, at 96, 98 & n.13 (stating that "the Court has
indicated that the intent of Congress governs the elements of the rule 10b-5 action,"
and citing as examples: Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983); Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472,
479 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)).
'5' Congress substantially adopted the Second Circuit's pleading standards in
the PSLRA. See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 2000):
We conclude that the PSLRA effectively raised the nationwide pleading
standard to that previously existing in this circuit and no higher ....
... As far as the general purposes of the PSLRA are concerned, Congress
plainly sought to impose a stricter nationwide pleading standard and did
so. But this purpose does not require raising the standard above that of this
circuit, particularly in light of the explicit Congressional recognition that
our pre-PSLRA standard was the most stringent in the nation.
Id; see also S. REP. No. 104-98, at 7 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 686(discussing the legislative purpose in drafting the loss causation provision into the
PSLRA as, "codifying the requirement under current law that plaintiffs prove that
the loss in the value of their stock was caused by the Section 10(b) violation and not
by other factors").
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the Second Circuit's loss causation prerequisites under section
21D of the PSLRA,'52 which states that "the plaintiff shall have
the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant
alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss for which the
plaintiff seeks to recover damages."'53  This statutory provision
codifies what the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits require: that plaintiffs plead and prove that the
defendants' misstatements or omission formed the causal basis
for the stock's decline in market value.'54 Conversely, both the
Eight and Ninth Circuits took a strikingly different and far more
lenient approach to loss causation.'55 Both of these circuits
merely required some showing of artificial price inflation, which
focuses not on the causal link between the fraud and the stock's
'52 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000).
153 Id. (emphasis added).
114 Eisenhofer et al., supra note 129, at 1430-37 (outlining thoroughly the
similar loss causation pleading standard-that the alleged fraud caused the decline
in stock price-utilized by the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits, as compared to the divergent loss causation standard-that there was an
artificial price inflation at the time of purchase-employed by the Eight and Ninth
Circuits).
"5 Compare Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938-39 (9th Cir. 2003),
rev'd, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, No. 03-932, 2005 WL 885109 (U.S. April 19,
2005), at *1, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005) ("Our cases have held... that: '[iun a fraud-on-
the-market case, plaintiffs establish loss causation if they have shown that the
price.., was inflated because of the misrepresentation."') (citations omitted), and
Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 831-32 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that
loss causation could be established under an artificial inflation of price theory), with
Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 198-99
(2d Cir. 2003) (holding that price inflation, without more, was not sufficient under
the Second Circuit's approach to loss causation), and Semerenko v. Cendant Corp.,
223 F.3d 165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000) (agreeing with the rationale of an Eleventh Circuit
decision which held that price inflation alone is not sufficient to satisfy the loss
causation requirement), and Robbins v. Koger Props. Inc, 116 F.3d. 1441, 1447-48
(11th Cir. 1997) ("Our cases do not hold that proof that a plaintiff purchased
securities at an artificially inflated price, without more, satisfies the loss causation
requirement."), and Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 684-86 (7th Cir.
1990) (squarely disagreeing with the artificial price inflation theory of loss
causation).
This circuit split lead the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, where the Court inevitably held that the Eighth and Ninth
Circuit's artificial price inflation theory "was inconsistent with the law's
requirement that a plaintiff prove that defendant's misrepresentation (or other
fraudulent conduct) proximately caused the plaintiffs economic loss," in turn
affirming the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit's requirement for a
causal link between the fraud and the drop in price. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v.
Broudo, No. 03-932, 2005 WL 885109 (U.S. April 19, 2005), at *1, *6, 125 S. Ct. 1627
(2005); see also supra note 21.
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decline in price, but rather on whether the stock's price was
inflated at the time of purchase based on the alleged
misrepresentation or omission. 5 6  Unfortunately, a critique of
these two divergent loss causation standards is beyond the scope
of this Comment. It is suggested, however, that the Second
Circuit's narrow loss causation approach-as clarified in Lentell
and unanimously affirmed in Dura Pharmaceuticals-is far more
in keeping with Congress's obvious intentions in drafting the
PSLRA.
Based on the foregoing, the plaintiffs in Lentell had to
establish that Merrill Lynch's failure to disclose its analysts'
conflicts of interest satisfied the requirements of both transaction
causation and loss causation.'57 As to the transaction causation
prong, the Lentell plaintiffs, without contest from the defendants,
relied on the fraud on the market theory to establish transaction
causation."' The circuit and the district courts held steadfast to
the supposition that "the fraud on the market theory, as
articulated by the Supreme Court, is used to support a rebuttable
presumption of reliance, not a presumption of causation."'5 9 The
fraud on the market theory cannot be used to shoe horn a
showing of transaction causation into a showing of the more
complicated and difficult loss causation standard. 60
In wrestling with the loss causation requirement, the
plaintiffs made a brash and largely misdirected attempt at
striding over the loss causation hurdle by arguing that "the
'Internet bubble' was a classic stock market manipulation
engineered by Wall Street's investment bankers and research
156 "[L]oss causation does not require pleading a stock price drop following a
corrective disclosure or otherwise. It merely requires pleading that the price at the
time of purchase was overstated and sufficient identification of the cause." Dura
Pharms., 339 F.3d at 938, rev'd, No. 03-932, 2005 WL 885109 (U.S. April 19, 2005),
at *1, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005).
157 See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 2005).
158 See id. ("Plaintiffs do not claim to have read Merrill's reports, or to have
bought 24/7 Media or Interliant securities through the Firm; instead, they rely on
the fraud-on-the-market presumption blessed in Basic v. Levinson.") (citation
omitted).
'59 See Robbins, 116 F.3d. at 1448 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
241-42); see also Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 198 (expounding on its decision in
Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 96-99 (2d Cir.
2001), and clarifying that transaction causation and loss causation are two distinct
elements that must be independently pleaded and proven).
160 See Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 198; Suez Equity, 250 F.3d at 96-99;
Robbins, 116 F.3d at 1448.
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analysts."'' The weight of the plaintiffs' argument collapsed on
itself. The district court hastily discounted this reckless
allegation: "There is no factual predicate or legitimate inference
from the facts alleged. . .-for plaintiffs' semantic invention of a
stock market manipulation for internet company
securities .... Giving short shrift to the plaintiffs' arguments,
the district court opined that it was the sudden deflation of the
technology stock bubble that caused the market depreciation of
the stocks at issue, not the failure to disclose alleged conflicts of
interest.163  Moreover, both courts swiftly distinguished the
present case from others in which the Second Circuit found that
loss causation was established based on a combination of theories
such as the materiality of the concealed risk and artificial price
inflation.'64 The circuit noted that the plaintiffs did not allege
that the 'subject of the fraudulent statement"' was Merrill
Lynch's recommendation to buy shares in these Internet
companies, nor that Merrill Lynch made a subsequent "corrective
disclosure" in reference to its recommendations, nor that Merrill
Lynch concealed the risks associated with either of the
161 In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351,
362 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
162 Id. ("Not even the freewheeling investigation and report make any such
assertion or suggestion as a prop for its criticisms."). The Second Circuit cited the
opinion of one member of its panel, Barrington D. Parker, who served years earlier
as a district court judge. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 177 ("[P]laintiffs have not made out
a market manipulation claim under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), and remain subject to the
heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA." (citing Schnell v. Conseco, Inc., 43
F. Supp. 2d 438, 447-48 (S.D.N.Y 1999))).
163 Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 362 ('The alleged omissions are not the
'legal cause' of the plaintiffs [sic] losses. There was no causal connection between the
burst of the bubble and the alleged omissions; it was the burst which caused the
market drop and the resultant losses a considerable time thereafter when plaintiffs
decided it was time to sell.").
'64 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 177 (explaining that Lentell "is therefore sharply
distinguishable from cases in which some or all of the risk that materialized was
clearly concealed by a defendant's misstatements or omissions" such as Emergent
Capital, 343 F.3d at 196-99 and Suez Equity, 250 F.3d at 97-98). In the lower court,
the plaintiffs relied on Judge Cote's In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d
392 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) decision in an attempt to base loss causation on an artificial
price inflation theory. Yet, Judge Pollack aptly retorted that, unlike the situation in
WorldCom, "[t]he complaints at issue here allege neither that Merrill Lynch
possessed material nonpublic information regarding the financial condition of 24/7
or Interliant, nor the existence of any such undisclosed financial arrangements."
Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 364 n.25 ('The Court respectfully submits that the
WorldCom decision is not broad enough to cover the allegations here.") (footnote
omitted).
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companies in question.' 65 Yet, the Lentell plaintiffs misguidedly
argued that the "defendant's misrepresentations and omissions
induced a 'purchase-time value disparity' between the price paid
for a security and its 'true investment quality."' 66  Squarely
disagreeing with the plaintiffs' suggestion, the circuit enlisted
the service of a prior decision where it sounded the death knell to
this line of debatable reasoning.167
In dicta, the court candidly remarked that members of the
Second Circuit have historically "disagreed as to whether certain
losses were attributable to a concealed risk."'' 68 As a result of this
disparity, the circuit explained the proper application of its loss
causation calculus, drawing considerably from three key
decisions:
[O]ur precedents make clear that loss causation has to do with
the relationship between the plaintiffs investment loss and the
information misstated or concealed by the defendant. If that
relationship is sufficiently direct, loss causation is established,
but if the connection is attenuated, or if the plaintiff fails to
"demonstrate a causal connection between the content of the
alleged misstatements or omissions and 'the harm actually
suffered,"' a fraud claim will not lie. 169
The precedential jewel in Lentell came when the circuit,
citing no authority for its pronouncement, uncluttered much of
the ambiguity enveloping loss causation by reducing its loss
165 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 175 (citation omitted) (concluding that plaintiffs
failed to allege loss causation because "[tihere is no allegation that the market
reacted negatively to a corrective disclosure regarding the falsity of Merrill's 'buy'
and 'accumulate' recommendations and no allegation that Merrill misstated or
omitted risks that did lead to the loss").
'6 Id. at 174 (quoting Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 198).167 See id. at 174-75. Rejecting the plaintiffs' argument, the Lentell court
concluded:
'[W]hen the plaintiffs loss coincides with a marketwide phenomenon
causing comparable losses to other investors, the prospect that the
plaintiffs loss was caused by the fraud decreases,' and a plaintiffs claim
fails when 'it has not adequately ple[]d facts which, if proven, would show
that its loss was caused by the alleged misstatements as opposed to
intervening events.'
Id. at 174 (alteration in original) (quoting First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding
Corp, 27 F.3d 763, 772 (2d Cir. 1994)).
168 Id. (citing Judge Jacobs's own concurrence in the mandate in AUSA Life Ins.
Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 224-28 (2d Cir. 2000)).
169 Id. (citing and quoting Emergent Capital, 343 F.3d at 198-99; Castellano v.
Young & Rubicam, Inc., 257 F.3d 171, 186-90 (2d Cir. 2001); Suez Equity, 250 F.3d
at 96-98).
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causation standard into a neatly packaged gift for practitioners
and law students alike: "To plead loss causation, the complaints
must allege facts that support an inference that Merrill's
misstatements and omissions concealed the circumstances that
bear upon the loss suffered such that plaintiffs would have been
spared all or an ascertainable portion of that loss absent the
fraud."
' 170
The circuit dealt its coup de grace by emphasizing that the
plaintiffs "fail[ed] to grapple" with "the price-volatility risk
inherent in the stocks they chose to buy."'71 All of the analysts'
reports were clearly captioned with warnings of the high level of
investment risk involved in these stocks. 172  It was this
''systematic and consistent risk indicator" denoted on the reports
in question that sealed the loss causation fate of the plaintiff
class. 173  With constructive knowledge of the inherent risks at
play in these investments from the outset, how could the
plaintiffs plead that their losses were causally linked to a later
materialization of the risks that were known at the time of
purchase?'74 Such reasoning defies logic.
When viewed in the aggregate, by clarifying its prior
decisions in Emergent Capital, Castellano, and Suez Equity, it is
submitted that the Second Circuit reinvigorated its loss
causation standards, stripping away much of the confusion and
ambiguity that had crept into the application of its loss causation
principles by the various courts within the Second Circuit.
175
170 Id. at 175.
171 Id. at 176.
172 See id. at 176-77.
171 Id. ("Plaintiffs do not allege that Merrill 'doctored' or hid, or omitted this
information, all of which suggests that 24/7 Media and Interliant were volatile,
devaluation-prone investments and that Merrill revealed as much in its reports.").
'74 Id. ("To plead successfully that Merrill's fraud caused their losses, plaintiffs
were required to allege facts to establish that the Firm's misstatements and
omissions concealed the price-volatility risk (or some other risk) that materialized
and played some part in diminishing the market value of 24/7 Media and
Interliant.").
171 Compare DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens Inc., No. 03 Civ. 590(GEL), 2005
WL 120233, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2005) (holding that the fraud-on-the-market
presumption satisfied the loss causation pleading standard), and In re WorldCom,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 267, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding the fraud-on-the-
market presumption satisfied the loss causation pleading), with DeMarco v. Lehman
Bros. Inc., 222 F.R.D. 243, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that the fraud-on-the-
market presumption would not satisfy the loss causation pleading as the plaintiffs
must still establish the causal connection between the fraud and the drop in stock
price).
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This Comment submits that the Lentell decision-irrespective of
its dispositive affect on analyst conflict cases-will be noted, and
perhaps criticized, for parsing through the fuzzy lines drawn by
prior precedents, culling from a chosen few decisions the pearls
that represent the central focus of the Second Circuit's loss
causation standard, while leaving behind most of the defective
reasoning and ambiguity.
CONCLUSION: THE REACH OF LENTELL
Lentell unequivocally makes the already uphill battle even
steeper for putative plaintiff classes alleging a violation of the
federal securities laws based on analyst conflicts of interest. By
providing black-letter guidance on what must be pleaded and
proven to establish loss causation, the Lentell court made the
historically elusive requirement of loss causation-especially as
applied to analysts' conflicts of interest-far less evasive. Now
that the loss causation standard has been clarified, it is
submitted that many more dismissals will be granted in
securities analyst conflict cases for failure to adequately plead
loss causation. This was a substantial gift to Wall Street, as it
provided a reprieve from the bombardment of class action
lawsuits it is presently embroiled in defending.
Nonetheless, the Lentell court passed on a small parting gift
to similarly situated plaintiffs; it tempered the draconian
application of Congress's brisk statute of limitations. By
insisting that district courts conduct a careful, fact-specific
examination of the available information to see if inquiry notice
was implicated, the circuit reconfirmed that only particularized,
issuer-specific data that places a reasonable investor on notice of
potential securities fraud would trigger the commencement of the
statute of limitations clock.
It is suggested that the precedential significance of the
Lentell decision reaches far beyond the analysts' conflicts of
interest cases. The Second Circuit established that it is
unwavering in its role as a PSLRA gatekeeper, ensuring that
pleading standards remain at the level originally intended by
Congress. Moreover, by clarifying prior and somewhat
contradictory Second Circuit decisions dealing with loss
causation, the Lentell panel answered a few of the questions that
troubled both sides of the counsel table, as well as the bench, in
securities fraud cases dealing with the PSLRA requirements.
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Moments of judicial clarity, like those found in Lentell's thorough
analysis, serve as an exemplar-be it mandatory or persuasive-
for district courts both within and without the Second Circuit as
federal courts continue to grapple with the proper application of
the loss causation requirement.
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